Integration with Damascus may spare Syrian Kurds another war. But the fate of Rojava will be decided less by declarations than by who controls the schools, checkpoints, oil fields, prisons and payrolls.
But there is another way to describe the story, and it is a less comfortable one. Rojava is not suffering a single dramatic collapse. Instead, it is experiencing the effects of administrative language, with decisions about its future made in ministries, not in trenches; on military payrolls, school curricula, border procedures, police activities and accounts for petroleum production. The important issue is not whether agreement has been reached between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces. Agreement has been achieved. The important issue is what type of agreement it is. Is it a basis for Kurdish survival within Syria, or for quiet but complete elimination of Kurdish forms of political autonomy? The result at present is that both are true: There is a rescue from immediate war and a reduction of all that previously was claimed for Rojava.
There are thus two versions of the story of Rojava’s integration into Syria. The first is the official account, sufficiently well-constructed to fit into a diplomatic statement. The Syrian state is re-establishing sovereignty, the Syrian Democratic Forces are entering national institutions, rights to Kurdish culture are being recognised, and the major anomaly of the Syrian war is being eliminated without another catastrophic war. This is a story acceptable to diplomats because it incorporates all the appropriate words: unity, stability, integration, reconciliation. It reflects the reassembly of a disintegrated country and offers to the Kurds of north-eastern Syria a final opportunity for survival within a new Syria. This version of events reflects some degree of truth. Integration is preferable to bombardment, and a negotiated transfer of power is preferable to conditions of siege. Recognition of Kurdish national identity, of rights to citizenship and to education in the Kurdish language, is not trivial for a country that previously had been especially adept at pretending that its Kurdish population did not exist.
The word “integration” accomplishes a great deal here and conveys a tone of neutrality, almost of therapy. Who could object to integration after 14 years of Syrian fragmentation? But integration may mean many different things. It may mean federalism in which a region retains substantial autonomy within a common state. Or it may mean decentralisation, with retention of some degree of autonomy by local institutions in acceptance of national sovereignty. It may represent administrative absorption with preservation of old structures only as names and records of personnel. Finally, it may represent a carefully tailored surrender. In the case of Rojava, the result is not federalism but incorporation. Kurdish fighters are not maintained as an independent armed force of Kurdish leadership but are incorporated into structures of Syrian defence and interior security. Units of internal security are integrated into the Ministry of the Interior, and institutions of the AANES merge with organs of the Syrian state. Oil fields, border crossings, airports, roads, prisons and camps ultimately enter the sphere of control of the capital. The change in flag may lag that of the chain of command, but it is the chain of command that ultimately is important.
This is why the military issue remains so central. The political experiment of Rojava did not survive more than a decade because Damascus continued to like its theory of democratic confederalism. It survived because the SDF had weapons, territory, cooperation with the United States and control over critical economic resources. These advantages have been sharply reduced. Establishment of new military organisations, including brigades of SDF forces operating under Syrian military control, should permit most former combatants to avoid defeat, dispersion or retaliation. That is important. Former checkpoint guards cannot simply disappear into civilian life in the face of a presidential signature and a declaration of military control. But there is a fundamental difference between modes of integration that maintain capacity for local defence and those that eliminate an independent system of military control and integrate it into a central command structure. Retention of local bases for payment and protection of SDF forces will continue to provide some degree of Kurdish leverage. Complete subordination of SDF forces to the requirements of a Syrian military hierarchy and to ultimate control by the government of Damascus will effectively eliminate all manifestations of armed autonomy in Rojava.
The future of a political order is perceived first not at the level of parliament, but at checkpoints. Who stops the vehicle? Who demands documents? Who controls the prison gate and investigates disappearances? Over many years, Asayish represented the daily experience of Kurdish control throughout much of north-eastern Syria. Their incorporation into the Syrian interior ministry constitutes an example of rational state-building, at least in some respects. No major country can afford to maintain an endless proliferation of parallel security forces without experiencing consequences. But for Kurds, restoration of central security institutions reflects a historical experience of vastly greater importance than merely technical aspects of security control. Syrian security is not an abstract bureaucratic entity for Kurdish memory. Rather, it reflects experiences of suspicion, interrogation, language restrictions, disappearance and continuing awareness of the fact that Kurdish political existence is permitted only when it is harmless. Security operations of limited scope in Hasakah and Qamishli appear to be relatively modest. But to the population of these areas, they mark the initiation of a psychological process of transfer of power.
The same is true of the autonomous administration of northern and eastern Syria. A lazy report would describe it simply as a Kurdish administration. It was considerably more complex than that. It was Kurdish-directed but not exclusively Kurdish, ideologically based but often improvisational, more pluralistic than most of Syria but never free of coercive or party control. Its supporters viewed it as a unique experience of female participation, of local councils, of multi-ethnic administration and of secular forms of government amid the ruins of a civil war. Its critics emphasised the dominance of PYD forces, compulsory military service, pressures on competing Kurdish political parties, grievances of Arab populations and difficulties of administering Arab-majority areas from a Kurdish-based centre. Both perspectives reflect important truths. Rojava was not a paradise, but neither was it simply another project of militia rule. Rather, it represented for many Kurds proof of the possibility of organising Kurdish life outside the old patterns of denial.
Consequently, the incorporation of civilian institutions of major importance. If its offices ultimately become equivalent to provincial offices with the same staff and many continuing features of local administration, some degree of continuity with experience will be achieved. Continued application of a co-chair system with male and female directors for local bodies will ensure further retention of the experience of Rojava. Maintenance of influence over appointments, education and provision of local services will result in a form of integration that will be of limited but real significance for Kurdish experience. However, if these institutions are simply renamed and then subordinated to normal conditions of provincial administration, the experience of Rojava will survive only as a memory. The risk is not elimination of all Kurdish institutions overnight, but rather continuation of their existence for such a short time that they lose all capacity for meaningful expression.
Culture is the optimistic, but also the easiest, part of the story with which Damascus is willing to negotiate. Recognition of Kurdish as a national language, restoration of statelessness to stateless Kurds and recognition of Nowruz as a national holiday are of major historical significance. For a Syrian Kurd whose family experienced the consequences of the 1962 census in Hasakah, citizenship is not a symbolic achievement, but a legal reality. For a child learning the Kurdish language in school, linguistic rights are not an embellishment, but a promise of the future. However, recognition of culture is not equivalent to attainment of political power. The state can accept Kurdish music, holidays and educational practices while concentrating control over security, budgets and command. In effect, this represents the type of compromise that Damascus prefers cultural recognition without political autonomy, acceptance of Kurdish identity without federalist structures, and an image of Kurdishness as a cultural rather than a political enterprise.
Education will be one of the major tests of this system. The struggle for the future of Rojava will be less intense in trenches than in classrooms. Who controls the content of the curriculum? Will instruction in the Kurdish language be accepted by Damascus or merely tolerated until replacement courses are developed? Will diplomas obtained under conditions of autonomy be recognised for purposes of admission to university and employment? Will teachers train under conditions of autonomy be incorporated into the national system of education? Finally, will the political implications of instruction in the schools of Rojava, particularly with respect to gender equality, local forms of democracy and history of the Kurdish people, be eliminated in the name of national unity? In the end, it will still be possible to teach Kurdish, but only within a framework that eliminates all reference to the political experience of Rojava. This will represent a highly sophisticated distinction between language and memory.
Semalka is more than its name suggests. A border crossing is never simply a border crossing, but always a channel for trade, aid, family contacts, access to the media and to the outside world of Kurdish politics. Complete control by Damascus reduces the remaining political “oxygen” for Rojava, whereas joint administration or participation by existing officials and the KRG maintain a limited degree of external contact. This is a particularly delicate situation for Erbil. The KRG seeks stability and does not want to risk a renewed war at its borders. In addition, it has highly complex relations with Turkey, the PYD, the Kurdish National Council associated with the KDP and with Baghdad. It supports the rights of Syrian Kurds but cannot translate its sympathies into leverage.
The capacity for protection of Rojava is ultimately limited by geography, patterns of trade and conditions of competition. Finally, there is the question of money. Autonomous conditions without financial resources constitute little more than political theatre. The power of Rojava was based not only on the courage of the defenders of Kobane or on the romantic appeal of the YPJ, but also on revenues from oil, wheat, border crossings, tariffs, salaries and independent management of public services in place of Damascus. If control of oil and gas fields in Deir ez-Zor and Hasakah, of the Semalka crossing, of Qamishli airport and of systems of public-sector salaries is achieved by the central government, then the basis for autonomy disappears. Remaining local councils will await allocations of funds, former fighters will receive salaries paid by Damascus, teachers will work under the supervision of Syrian ministries, and the result will be a system in which Kurds receive either a guaranteed share of resources or only an amount of assistance from the centre. The former represents political settlement; the latter reflects a continuing degree of dependency.
The ISIS file tells a story that should interest even those who have little sympathy for Kurdish aspirations. For years, the world depended on the SDF to hold prisoners and operate camps such as al-Hol and Roj. These facilities were never a solution, but rather a warehouse for an unresolved international failure. If Damascus assumes responsibility for prisons and camps, the transition must be orderly. Otherwise, ISIS will not await patiently for completion of administrative procedures. Transfer of prisoners to Iraq and continued international efforts to combat ISIS will reduce, but not eliminate, the risk. They also confirm once again the discomforting reality that current requirements for integration continue to depend on management of the consequences of war with ISIS by forces in north-eastern Syria. The political project of Rojava will presumably be unnecessary to these forces, but their security contributions will not be.
Turkey observes all these developments with substantially different priorities. It does not perceive the SDF as an oppressed Kurdish force struggling against ISIS, but rather as the Syrian component of a structure associated with the PKK on its border. For Turkey, integration is acceptable only at the expense of eliminating the SDF as an independent military force. All lesser efforts will be regarded as camouflage. This provides an incentive for Damascus to demonstrate unequivocally that it and not the Kurds control the north-east. In addition, it increases the fears of Syrian Kurdish forces that integration with Damascus ultimately will represent an indirect acceptance of the security policies of Ankara. The position of Turkey is certainly not irrelevant. The country has military forces, surrogate political representatives, leverage at its borders and extensive experience with military intervention. However, it must not be permitted to interpret every political demand of the Kurds as a manifestation of terrorism. Finally, we must recognise that it will be considerably easier for the new Syrian state to satisfy concerns of Turkey than to alleviate fears of the Kurdish population.
The United States is no less important, perhaps less reassuring than Kurds would prefer. Our support made the SDF a militarily powerful force but ultimately revealed that military collaboration does not equal political protection. Our officials may celebrate integration as a historic opportunity and insist that measures of Kurdish cultural protection and political participation reflect a satisfactory settlement. However, our major concern remains much narrower: prevention of a resurgence of ISIS, avoidance of another regional war and reduction of exposure.
The SDF again confirmed the experience of small nations and of non-state allies. Major powers may admire your courage, depend on your armed forces and applaud your sacrifices, but will rarely assure you of a future of constitutional rights. Nor should this article become merely an expression of Kurdish grief. Arab areas under our control were administered by a Kurdish revolutionary government with which many residents had little in common. Arab patterns of tribal organisation, exploitation of oil, recollection of experiences with ISIS and resentment of Kurdish-dominated security arrangements profoundly influenced conditions of life in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Some Arabs welcomed the return of Syrian authority not because they loved the Syrian state, but because they had been unhappy with control by a Kurdish-dominated security apparatus. Assyrians, Syriacs, Yazidis and Christians experienced other major fears of political and religious domination by Kurdish revolutionary forces, by Arab nationalist movements or by Turkish-supported military factions. In the end, all groups experienced the ultimate consequence of involvement with a major power: complete neglect by all larger political and military forces. Finally, our experience with Rojava again confirmed the ultimate importance of a political and military strategy of integration for all minority populations and for all non-state political forces.
The future is unlikely to be clean. Rojava will probably not survive as it envisioned itself: as a permanent, armed, autonomous and ideologically distinct region with its own military, economy and institutions. That opportunity has passed but may not disappear completely. There will remain traces of Kurdish identity in rights to language, modes of local administration, institutions of culture, participation by women, practices of municipal government and in some negotiated appointments. The result will appear more as a hybrid than as autonomy, with Syrian sovereignty above and traces of Kurdish identity below. Whether this represents a defeat or a capacity for survival depends on what is implemented, enforced and supported. Ultimately, it is the behaviour of the state, not the language of the agreement, that will determine the outcome.
Will former fighters of the SDF receive salaries without subsequent arrests? Will members of Asayish become recognised police officers rather than remain in custody? Will Kurdish schools continue to operate and receive official accreditation? Will the system of co-chairmanship function effectively rather than merely in interviews? Will revenues from oil be distributed or simply diverted? Will the system of Semalka continue to operate effectively? Will detainees from ISIS be managed without generating chaos? Will Kurdish political parties be allowed to criticise the regime in Damascus? Will institutions of women’s rights function with complete freedom from ritualistic language? Finally, will displaced Kurds from Afrin and other regions be permitted to return to their homes safely, or will return to the homeland represent only an epilogue? In the end, the strength of any commitment depends entirely on the capacity of the institution to enforce it.
Rojava was built in war but may be destroyed by paperwork. This is the ultimate irony of our times. A region once so exciting to the world with its barricades, female fighters and war against ISIS now must pass a far less dramatic test: whether it can survive mechanisms of form, appointment, ministry and documentation. Integration will avoid another war, and that is of major importance. But peace without enforceable rights will ultimately represent only the preferred mode of victory for the state. The future of Rojava will depend not on whether Damascus will declare that Kurds belong in Syria, but on whether Kurds will continue to exercise power in the Syria to which they are returning.
For now, the guns are quieter. The bureaucracy has begun.
